the operational art of war iv default folder

The current method by which the United States views the interplay of the levels of war is insufficient to translate tactical victories into strategic and political successes, requiring a new way of viewing operational art and warfare. They are a failure of the American view of war and a failure of our model for operational art.

These failures are not a product of the American intellect, spirit, ingenuity, or will. Why, then, with so many tactical victories, is the American record of strategic success so dismal? What has prevented us from turning our battlefield successes to strategic victories, and why have we struggled so much in attaining our stated political goals? The War of 1812, the Banana Wars, World War I, Korea, Vietnam, Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan all saw brilliant battlefield victories with limited strategic success. Beginning with General George Washington's ability to avoid defeat in detail while wearing down the British army, the United States has enjoyed a long history of tactical victories and successful campaigns.

Since America's founding, most of our tactical experiences have been those of success in battle and hard-won campaigns.

A particular strategic policy must be devised for every war each war is a special case, which requires its own particular logic rather than any kind of stereotype or pattern, no matter how splendid it may be.

The operational art of war iv default folder